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分税制改革削弱了地方政府的财权,使得预算内财政收入发生了重大的结构调整,提高了地方政府对国有资本经营收入的依赖程度。本研究基于2001-2010年A股国有上市公司的数据,检验了地方政府平衡财政收支目标对国有企业现金股利支付水平的影响。研究发现,财政赤字水平越高的地区,国有上市公司的现金股利支付水平越高;国有上市公司支付的每股现金股利和地区财政赤字之间的关系在2003年之后变得更加显著,说明地方政府希望国有资本的收益能够弥补所得税分享方案造成的税收收益的损失;财政赤字水平较高的地区,国有上市公司现金股利和投资机会之间的关系不明显,说明地方政府弥补财政赤字的动机扭曲了企业的分配决策,一定程度上增加了企业的融资成本。本研究发现支持了“掠夺之手”理论,说明要健全投资者保护机制、建立成熟的资本市场、保护中小投资者的利益,必须减少政府对企业的干预。
Tax-sharing reform weakened the fiscal power of local governments, led to major structural changes in budgetary revenues, and increased the reliance of local governments on state-owned capital management revenues. Based on the data of A-share state-owned listed companies from 2001 to 2010, this study examines the impact of local government’s balance of financial revenue and expenditure targets on the payment of cash dividends by state-owned enterprises. The study found that the higher the level of fiscal deficit, the higher the cash dividend payment of state-owned listed companies; the relationship between the cash dividend per share paid by state-owned listed companies and the regional fiscal deficit became more significant after 2003, indicating that local The government hopes that the revenue of state-owned capital can make up for the loss of tax revenue caused by the income tax sharing plan. In areas with high fiscal deficit, the relationship between the cash dividend of state-owned listed companies and investment opportunities is not obvious. This shows that the local government is distorted by its motivation to remedy the fiscal deficit The allocation of business decisions, to some extent increased the cost of financing enterprises. This study finds that it supports the theory of “plunder”, which shows that it is necessary to reduce the government intervention in enterprises by improving the investor protection mechanism, establishing a mature capital market and protecting the interests of small and medium-sized investors.