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本文以股改之前七年内引发控制权变更的非流通股协议转让事件为样本,区分本地并购与异地并购、相关并购与多元化并购,对实际控制人通过转让控制权攫取私有收益的程度进行研究发现,地方政府实际控制人,以及普遍受到地方政府干预的非政府实际控制人将控制权转让给异地、异行企业时获得的转让溢价更高;支付较高控制权转让溢价的并购方实施内幕交易的程度更严重,获得的累计超额收益更多。
This article takes the non-negotiable share transfer event that triggered the change of control within seven years prior to the share reform as a sample to distinguish between local mergers and acquisitions, off-site mergers and acquisitions, related mergers and acquisitions and diversified mergers and acquisitions, and to study the extent to which actual controllers take private gains through the transfer of control rights , The actual controllers of local governments and non-government actual controllers who are generally interfered by local governments get a higher transfer premium when they transfer their control right to off-site and off-line enterprises; and the M & A party that pays a premium for the transfer of control has implemented insider trading The degree of more serious, access to accumulated excess returns more.