论文部分内容阅读
从博弈激励的视角考察,双层股权结构公司中的控制股东与公众投资者通过资本市场的渠道形成了长期博弈关系,公众投资者基于退出公司的行为策略对控制股东的经营管理行为构成监督与威慑,从而形成了对控制股东的有效激励。博弈激励解释避免了增加代理成本、损害公司与中小股东利益、控制权交易市场监督机制失灵三个方面对双层股权结构的责难。
From the perspective of the game incentive, the controlling shareholders and public investors in the double-tier shareholding structure form a long-term game relationship through the capital market channels. Public investors monitor and supervise the operation and management of the controlling shareholder based on the exit strategy of the company Deterrence, thus forming an effective incentive to control the shareholders. The game incentive explanation avoids the censure of the double ownership structure from three aspects: increasing the agency cost, damaging the interests of the company and the minority shareholders, and the failure of the supervisory mechanism of the control market.