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德莱斯基在《意识经验》一文中认为,要探究意识经验的本质和意识自身,就要区分事物性意识和事实性意识,正如我们关于外在的知觉可以分为知觉经验和知觉信念。只有区分了这两种不同的意识,我们才能进一步探究是什么使得经验能够被认知主体意识到。德莱斯基通过考察事物性意识和事实性意识之间的关系,最终论证说我们关于外在事物(或事实)的经验和意识自身能够被我们意识到,不是由于我们对于事物本身的意识,而是这种经验或意识自身作为某种表征在我们的意识过程中所扮演的角色。文章试图对他的这一思想进行分析。
In his article “Consciousness Experience,” Draysky argues that to explore the essence of consciousness experience and consciousness itself, it is necessary to distinguish between matter consciousness and factual consciousness, just as our external perception can be divided into perceptual experience and perceptual belief. Only by distinguishing between these two different kinds of consciousness can we explore further what makes the experience conscious of the subject. By examining the relationship between materialism and factual consciousness, Draysky finally argues that our experience and consciousness of external things (or facts) can themselves be recognized by us not because of our awareness of the things themselves, But rather the role of this experience or consciousness as a token of itself in our conscious process. The article tries to analyze his thought.