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本文利用博弈理论分别构建了在利率管制和市场化环境下的异质性银行垄断竞争模型,对大型和中小型银行贷款供给的政策敏感性进行了比较分析。研究发现,在利率管理制价格约束环境下,银行间竞争表现为规模博弈,大型商业银行的政策敏感性要强于中小银行。而在利率市场化环境下,价格博弈是商业银行竞争的主要形式,大型商业银行的政策敏感性弱于中小银行。同时,在实际业务操作中,0.9倍基准利率仍然是实际贷款利率浮动下限。随后本文分析了信贷市场供需结构,并结合银行微观数据进行了实证检验,结果支持了理论模型的研究结论。因此,货币政策调控信贷供给的过程中,需要关注信贷市场供需状况和异质性银行的政策敏感性,通过加强结构型工具的作用,稳定中小银行的流动性,进而为中小企业融资提供稳定的货币环境。
This paper constructs a heterogeneous bank monopolistic competition model under the interest rate control and market-oriented environment using game theory, and makes a comparative analysis of the policy sensitivity of large and small and medium-sized bank loans. The study finds that in the environment of price control of interest rate management system, the competition among banks shows scale game, and the sensitivity of large commercial banks is stronger than that of small and medium-sized banks. Under the market-oriented interest rate environment, the price game is the main form of competition among commercial banks. The policy sensitivity of large commercial banks is weaker than that of small and medium-sized banks. In the meantime, in actual business operations, the 0.9x benchmark interest rate is still the lower limit of the real lending rate. Subsequently, this paper analyzes the structure of supply and demand in the credit market and conducts an empirical test based on the micro-data of banks. The results support the conclusion of the theoretical model. Therefore, in the process of controlling the supply of credit by monetary policy, it is necessary to pay attention to the credit market supply and demand and the policy sensitivity of heterogeneous banks. By strengthening the function of structural instruments, stabilizing the liquidity of small and medium-sized banks and providing stable financing for SMEs Monetary environment.