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考虑制造商负责回收和处理废旧产品的两级闭环供应链,建立制造商主导的Stackelberg博弈下的微分对策模型,以废旧产品回收量影响的企业声誉为状态变量,利用反馈求解法得出制造商和零售商的最优决策.在此基础上,假设奖惩临界值受企业声誉影响,得出奖惩契约协调下的供应链最优决策.通过对奖惩契约有和无两种情形的决策进行对比,得出废旧产品回收成本系数与企业声誉和奖惩力度均成反向变动关系;在一定的参数条件下,采用奖惩契约能提高废旧产品的回收量,降低产品的销售价格,增加制造商和零售商的收益,达到社会、企业和消费者的多赢;当供应链系统参数满足一定条件时,相比无契约分散决策下供应链企业收益,奖惩契约的设计与实施能够持续有效地提高企业收益.
Considering the two-stage closed-loop supply chain in which the manufacturer is responsible for recycling and disposing of used products, a manufacturer-led differential game model under Stackelberg game is established. Using the reputation of enterprises affected by the amount of waste products recovered as the state variables, And the retailer’s optimal decision-making.On the basis of this, we assume that the reward and punishment threshold value is affected by the reputation of the enterprise and get the optimal supply chain decision-making under the coordination of reward and punishment contract.Through contrasting the decision-making with and without reward and punishment contract, Draw the conclusion that the coefficient of recycling cost of waste products is inversely related to the reputation and rewards and punishments of enterprises. Under the condition of certain parameters, using the reward and deed contract can increase the recovery amount of waste products, reduce the selling price of products, increase the manufacturers and retailers When the system parameters of the supply chain satisfy certain conditions, the design and implementation of the rewards and punishments contract can continuously and effectively improve the firm’s profit compared with the profit of the supply chain firm without decentralized decision-making.