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已有关于政治关联的研究取得了丰富的研究成果,识别了政治关联能够为上市公司引入资源的功能。本文利用2004~2015年中国上市公司的数据,通过分析独立董事的政治关联与政府补贴之间的关系以及地区市场化程度对这种关系的调节作用,证明了独立董事政治关联为上市公司提供资源的功能。研究发现:独立董事的政治关联有利于上市公司获取更多的政府补贴,且独立董事政治关联的这种作用在市场化程度较低时更明显。进一步的研究发现,独立董事政治关联所带来的政府补贴并未得到有效的利用。
Research on political connections has made abundant research achievements and identified the function that political connections can bring in resources for listed companies. Based on the data of Chinese listed companies from 2004 to 2015, this paper analyzes the relationship between independent directors’ political connections and government subsidies and the regulatory role of regional marketization on this relationship, and proves that the political affiliations of independent directors provide resources for listed companies Function The study finds that the political affiliations of independent directors are beneficial for listed companies to obtain more government subsidies, and the role of independent affiliations in politics is more obvious when the degree of marketization is lower. Further research found that the government subsidies brought by the political affiliations of independent directors have not been effectively utilized.