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从演化博弈的角度出发,针对政府不同的环境政策,即政府减污经济激励政策和政府控制命令政策,建立了排污企业群体之间的博弈模型以及企业与政府、企业与环保部门博弈的复制动态方程,并对动态方程作了分析,得出了企业群体和政府、监管部门博弈的演化稳定策略。通过政府职能,促进企业排污达标的力度,从而体现出政府对市场进行干预和调控的必要性。
From the perspective of evolutionary game, aiming at the different environmental policies of the government, that is, the government’s policy of reducing economic incentives and government control orders, a game model between the enterprises of the sewage disposal enterprises and the game dynamics between the enterprises and the government, the enterprises and the environmental protection departments Equation, and the dynamic equation was analyzed, the evolution of the game group and the government and regulators strategy stability. Through the government functions, to promote enterprise emission standards, so as to reflect the government intervention in the market and the need for regulation.