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针对保障性住房申请过程中出现的不诚信申请问题,建立了审核部门与申请者之间的演化博弈模型,进而分析了两者的复制动态和演化博弈稳定策略,以及演化博弈系统的稳定性。结果表明,当申请者进行不诚信申请的收益大于不诚信申请的成本、政府部门对审核部门的奖罚力度不够且严格审核的成本过高时,不诚信申请必然出现。要确保不诚信申请的概率降低,就必须对保障性住房严格管理,对不诚信申请者进行严惩,在控制其预期收益的基础上提高成本,同时要加大对审核部门的监管及奖罚力度,加强审核队伍的建设。
In view of the application of dishonesty in the application of affordable housing, an evolutionary game model between audit department and applicant is set up, and then the strategy of replication dynamics and evolutionary game stability and the stability of evolutionary game system are analyzed. The results show that the application of dishonest application will inevitably occur when the applicant’s income from the dishonest application is greater than the cost of the dishonest application, the rewards and penalties imposed by the government department on the audit department are not enough, and the cost of the strict examination is too high. To ensure that the probability of dishonest applications is reduced, it is necessary to strictly manage affordable housing, severely punish those who do not believe in good faith, and increase costs on the basis of controlling their expected benefits. At the same time, they should step up supervision over regulatory authorities and rewards and penalties , Strengthen the construction of audit team.