一、政府预算委托代理关系的特征 及其效应分析 委托代理理论原本是用来研究企业经济行为的理论工具,通过这一理论工具来说明现代企业制度的所有权和经营权分离的特征,寻求公司治理的合理结构,其结论是:由建立激励和约束机制、由经理人员获得剩余收益来降低代理成本,此后该结论进一步发展到对代理人的 First, the characteristics of the government budget agency relationship and its effects Analysis The principal-agent theory was originally used to study the economic behavior of enterprises as a theoretical tool to explain the characteristics of the separation of ownership and management of the modern enterprise system through this theoretical tool to seek corporate governance The conclusion is: the establishment of incentive and restraint mechanisms, by managers to obtain residual income to reduce agency costs, then the conclusion further developed to the agent