道德风险引起的搭便车是使团队效率低下的重要原因,传统理论认为让一个具有剩余索取权的人发挥监督职能将有效解决这一问题。但实际上,为使监督者有积极性监督别人,并不需要赋予监督者剩余索取权。在一个团队合作的博弈中,委托人只需采用一个歧视性的激励机制,即科层制度,使监督者和被监督者都选择努力工作构成一个纳什均衡。科层制度使得完成相同任务的代理人具有不同的收益,因此本质上是一个具有监督功能的歧视性激励机制。企业的科层性质大大减少了激励成本,并使得某些面临囚徒困境的合作得以实现。 Free riding caused by moral hazard is an important reason for team inefficiency. According to the traditional theory, letting a person with residual claims play a supervisory role will effectively solve this problem. In practice, however, there is no need to give the supervisor the residual claim in order for the supervisor to be motivated to supervise others. In a game of team cooperation, the client only needs to adopt a discriminatory incentive mechanism, that is, bureaucracy, so that both the supervisor and the supervisor choose to work hard to form a Nash equilibrium. The bureaucratic system makes the agents who perform the same tasks have different benefits and is therefore essentially a discriminatory incentive mechanism with oversight function. The bureaucratic nature of the enterprise has greatly reduced the incentive costs and enabled some cooperation that faces the prisoner’s dilemma to be realized.