研究了需求具有价格和时间均敏感条件下两个具有风险规避特性的零售商间价格与交货期竞争决策问题。首先,分析了Bertrand博弈模式下两个风险规避零售商间的价格与交货期决策行为;其次,分析了Stackelberg博弈模式下两个风险规避零售商间的价格与交货期决策行为;最后,通过数值分析发现零售商过度风险规避会导致在竞争中处于劣势,并发现在Stackelberg双寡头博弈下的价格高于Bertrand双寡头博弈下。 This paper studies the problem of price and delivery time competition among two retailers with risk aversion under the condition of price and time sensitive. First of all, we analyzed the decision-making of price and delivery period between two retailers in Bertrand game mode. Secondly, we analyzed the pricing and delivery decision-making behaviors of two retailers in the Stackelberg game. Finally, By numerical analysis, it is found that retailers’ excessive risk aversion leads to a disadvantage in competition and finds that the price under Stackelberg duopoly game is higher than that under Bertrand duopoly game.