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在现代企业两权分离的情况下,资源配置和创造财富主要依靠经营者实现,企业的运营结果主要取决于经营者的素质和行为趋向,而经营者的素质和行为趋向则通常受企业内部机制影响,企业如果不能形成一套合理的内部机制,“委托—代理”矛盾将会深化,企业就会因此而付出较大的代价。正是为了解决“委托—代理”的矛盾,西方国家较早地发明了一种有效地激励约束办法—激励性股票期权制度。笔者拟就激励性股票期权的理论基础略书管见,求教于法学界同仁。
In the case of the separation of the two rights of modern enterprises, the allocation of resources and the creation of wealth mainly rely on the operator to achieve, the operating results of enterprises depends mainly on the quality of managers and behavior trends, and managers tend to tend to the quality and behavior of internal mechanisms If the enterprise can not form a reasonable internal mechanism, the contradiction of “commission-agency” will be deepened and the enterprise will pay a greater price. It is precisely to solve the contradiction of “commission - agent ”, the western countries invented an effective incentive and restraint method earlier - incentive stock option system. I intend to motivate the theoretical basis of stock options a little book see, seek advice in law circles colleagues.