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论文研究了两个销售商在拥有各自销售市场并面对相同供应商情况下的市场进入策略.分析了单个企业进入对方市场和两个企业同时互相进入对方市场的情况,得出了在不同情况下供应商的最优定价策略,以及销售商们的采购数量和销售商们在各市场上输出的产品数量.研究发现在大多数情况下销售商们的纳什均衡解为互相进入对方市场.但是当两个市场的市场规模和价格弹性相近的时候,销售商们面临“囚徒困境”——虽然互相进入对方的市场是市场进入博弈的纳什均衡,但销售商的利润值均低于各自选择不进入对方市场时的收益.
This paper studies the market entry strategy of two vendors in the presence of their own sales markets and facing the same supplier.It analyzes the situation that a single enterprise enters into the other party’s market and the two firms enter each other’s markets into each other at the same time, The optimal pricing strategy for the next supplier, as well as the sales volume of the vendors and the number of products the vendors sell in each market, found that in most cases the Nash equilibrium of the vendors is the solution to each other’s market. When the market size and price elasticity of both markets are similar, the vendors face the “Prisoners Dilemma.” - Although the markets entering each other are Nash equilibriums in which markets enter the game, the profits of the vendors are lower than their respective Choose not to enter the other market when the proceeds.