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本文在信贷契约道德风险起源及其缓解机制探讨基础上,指出了横向监督机制对企业家道德风险行为的规制作用并分析了其原理。采用比较制度实验研究方法,构建了基于计算机局域网的三组并行的实验室实验,分析了三种信贷市场中横向监督机制的治理效率,对比研究了三种竞争状态下的市场绩效和收益分布。结果表明,买方竞争强化了横向监督机制的治理效能,卖方竞争削弱了横向监督机制的治理效能;对称市场的签约比率波动最大,卖方竞争市场的守约比率下降最快;买方竞争市场平均绩效最高且投资者占有了较大比例的交易剩余。本文的研究结论为市场竞争和横向监督交互下的信贷契约参与人激励相容提供了行为分析基础,也为完善转轨经济环境下的投资者权益保障机制设计提供了参考。
Based on the discussion of the origin and mitigation mechanism of moral hazard of credit contract, this paper points out the regulatory function of horizontal supervision mechanism on entrepreneur moral hazard behavior and analyzes its principle. Using comparative experimental study, three parallel laboratory experiments based on computer local area network are constructed. The efficiency of horizontal supervision mechanism in three credit markets is analyzed, and the market performance and return distribution under three competitive states are compared. The results show that the buyer’s competition strengthens the governance effectiveness of the horizontal supervision mechanism and the seller’s competition weakens the governance effectiveness of the horizontal supervision mechanism. The systolic rate of the systolic market fluctuates most, the defensive ratio of the seller’s competitive market declines most rapidly, and the average performance of the buyer’s competitive market is the highest And investors hold a larger proportion of the remaining transactions. The conclusion of this paper provides a basis of behavior analysis for the incentive compatibility of credit contract participants under the interaction of market competition and horizontal supervision. It also provides reference for the design of the safeguard mechanism for investors’ rights under the transitional economy.