论文部分内容阅读
将银行与中小企业间的动态博弈过程视为一个“模仿学习”的渐进系统,在考察银行贷款成本、中小企业还款成本及其群体特征的基础上,运用演化博弈论构建中小企业抵押贷款及互助担保贷款的演化博弈模型,对比分析两种贷款模式的演化路径及其相应条件,探讨如何缓解中小企业融资难问题.结果表明抵押贷款在现实条件下无法达到最优均衡状态,而互助担保贷款既可以增强中小企业的融资能力,又规避了银行的贷款风险,推动银行与企业动态博弈过程向最优均衡解演化,达到互利双赢.
Considering the dynamic game process between banks and SMEs as a gradual system of “imitation learning”, based on the investigation of the bank loan cost, the repayment cost of SMEs and their group characteristics, this paper uses evolutionary game theory to construct the mortgage of SMEs Loan and mutual guarantee loan, and contrast the evolutionary path and corresponding conditions of the two loan modes to discuss how to alleviate the financing difficulty of SMEs.The results show that the mortgage loan can not reach the optimal equilibrium under the real conditions, and mutual aid Secured loans can not only enhance the financing ability of SMEs, but also avoid the bank’s loan risk, promote the process of bank-enterprise dynamic game evolution to the optimal equilibrium solution, and achieve mutually beneficial win-win situation.