在特定政府服务中,索取贿赂是否与政策实施的加速或延迟相关,是腐败在私营产业发展中角色讨论的重点。“行贿提高效率”的假设,主张行贿行为作为一种润滑剂,意味着三个可检验的推断。第一,平均而言,索取贿赂可能会与等待的时间存在负向关联;第二,这种关系可能会在不同的企业中出现不同的情况,那些可能会为等待付出最高的机会成本的企业极有可能行贿,并且面临更短的延迟。第三,贿赂的作用在不同的国家是不同的,在管制严格的国家中,行贿的作用更大。数据与这三种推断是 Whether or not a bribe is sought in specific government services in relation to the acceleration or delay of policy implementation is the focus of discussion on the role of corruption in the development of the private sector. “Bribery to improve efficiency ” hypothesis, advocating bribery as a lubricant, implies three testable inference. First, on average, a bribe may be negatively linked to waiting times. Second, the relationship may be different for different businesses, and businesses that may be waiting for the highest opportunity cost Very likely to pay bribes and face shorter delays. Third, the role of bribery varies from one country to another. In heavily regulated countries, bribery is more effective. The data and these three inferences are