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本文以2005~2014年中国A股上市公司为样本,考察了投资组合视角下的监督型基金持股与企业风险承担水平的关系。研究发现,监督型基金持股与企业风险承担显著负相关,在考虑了监督型基金的内生性后结论依然成立。进一步研究发现:当公司面临的市场竞争程度较低、宏观经济景气时,监督型基金对风险承担的负向作用越强。上述结果表明从抑制企业风险性投资的角度而言,监督型基金的存在并没有完全起到改善公司治理和提高公司价值的作用,机构投资者的角色问题需要监管机构进一步引导。同时经济转型期如何增加市场活力、规范引导基金良性投资,都是政策制定者和监管层应思考的问题。
Based on the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2005 to 2014, this paper examines the relationship between the supervised fund holdings and the corporate risk appetite under the portfolio perspective. The study found that there is a significant negative correlation between the supervised fund holdings and the corporate risk appetite, and the conclusion still holds after considering the endogenous nature of the supervisory funds. Further research found that: when the company is facing a low degree of market competition, the negative impact of the supervisory funds on risk exposure is stronger when the macroeconomy is prospering. The above results show that from the perspective of inhibiting venture capital investment, the existence of supervisory funds does not completely improve the corporate governance and enhance the value of the company. The role of institutional investors needs to be further guided by the regulatory agencies. At the same time, how to increase the vitality of the market during the economic transition and regulate the healthy investment of the guiding funds are all questions that policymakers and regulators should consider.