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在我国地方政府分权的制度背景下,养老保险逃费不仅仅是因为缴费主体的规避原因,也有着地方政策执行主体的激励问题。我国地方分权的政治经济制度结构导致地方政府为促进当地的经济增长,而有着牺牲劳工利益,追求较低劳动力成本的倾向,这导致地方社会保险费征缴机关的激励扭曲、征缴懈怠。然而,我国养老保险制度体系中的两种类型的转移支付则直接导致这种征缴懈怠。本文在财政分权的背景下,分析了地方政府在社会保险管理运行中的行为逻辑,并结合养老保险制度运行中的两种类型的转移支付,分析了其行为选择,并提出了相关的治理措施。
Under the institutional background of decentralization of local governments in our country, the retirement insurance escapes not only because of the evading reasons of the contributors, but also has the incentive of the local policy executors. The structure of the political and economic system of decentralization in our country led to the tendency of local governments to promote local economic growth with the tendency of sacrificing labor interests and pursuing lower labor costs. This led to the distortions in the incentives of local social insurance levies and the collection of slackness. However, the two types of transfer payment in the system of pension insurance in our country directly lead to such lag in collection. In the background of fiscal decentralization, this paper analyzes the behavioral logic of local government in the operation of social insurance management. Combined with the two types of transfer payment in the operation of pension insurance system, this paper analyzes the behavior choices and puts forward the relevant governance Measures.