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CEO与副总经理之间的垂直薪酬差异筛选效应是指垂直薪酬差异对副总经理主动离职倾向的影响。本文利用2005—2015年我国A股上市公司数据,考察了CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异筛选效应的影响。CEO权力的发挥会受到公司内部治理结构和外部治理环境的影响,因而本文还考察了CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异筛选效应的影响是否受制于上市公司的产权性质和上市公司所在地的市场化进程。研究发现,CEO权力越大,垂直薪酬差异对副总经理主动离职率的正向影响越大,说明CEO权力加重了垂直薪酬差异的负向筛选效应;相比非国有企业,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异与国有企业副总经理主动离职率关系的正向影响更大,说明CEO权力对国有企业垂直薪酬差异负向筛选效应的影响大于非国有企业;市场化进程越高,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异与副总经理主动离职率关系的正向影响越小,说明市场化进程越高,CEO权力对垂直薪酬差异负向筛选效应的影响越小。进一步研究还发现,CEO权力越大,垂直薪酬差异通过副总经理主动离职率对公司绩效的间接负向影响越大,说明CEO权力加重了垂直薪酬差异筛选效应对公司绩效的负向影响。本文为CEO权力影响高管行为及公司绩效提供了新的研究视角。
The effect of vertical pay difference screening between CEOs and deputy general managers refers to the influence of vertical pay differences on the proactive separation intention of the deputy general manager. Based on the data of A-share listed companies in China from 2005 to 2015, this paper examines the impact of CEO power on the screening effect of vertical pay differentials. Therefore, this article also examines whether the impact of CEO power on the screening effect of vertical pay differentials is subject to the property rights of listed companies and the marketization process of listed companies’ location. The study found that the larger the CEO power, the greater the positive influence of the vertical pay difference on the deputy manager’s turnover rate, which shows that the CEO power aggravates the negative screening effect of the vertical pay difference. Compared with the non-state-owned enterprises, The positive influence of the difference and the active separation rate of the deputy general manager of the state-owned enterprises is greater, which shows that the influence of the CEO power on the negative selection effect of the vertical compensation difference of the state-owned enterprises is greater than the non-state-owned enterprises; the higher the marketization process, The positive impact of the relationship with the deputy manager’s turnover rate is smaller, indicating that the higher the marketization process, the less influence the CEO’s power has on the negative selection effect of vertical pay differentials. Further research also found that the larger the CEO power, the greater the indirect negative impact of the vertical pay differentials on the company’s performance indirectly through the active turnover rate of the deputy general manager, indicating that the CEO power aggravates the negative impact of the vertical pay differentials screening on corporate performance. This article provides a new perspective on the impact of CEO power on senior executive performance and corporate performance.