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The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea （DPRK） on February 12 carried out its third nuclear test—the first since Kim Jong Un came into power. The test triggered a storm of reaction from the international community， including worries about a possible leak of nuclear materials among neighboring countries.
Analysis of the greater context shows that the primary purpose of possessing nuclear capability is not to wield nuclear power， nor to conquer the world， but to ensure a necessary external security environment to develop its economy.
Safety and economy
According to socialist political economic principles， a socialist economy must satisfy people’s material and cultural needs depending on a highly developed technological basis. However， a socialist country like the DPRK cannot concentrate fully on its own economic development strategy because of the tough external environment of Western economic blockades， or even the threat of military intervention.
In a legal sense， the Korean Peninsula has never ended its state of war since the truce with the United States and the Republic of Korea（ROK） in 1953. The DPRK felt great pressure from the West and the ROK after the dissolution of the Soviet Union， which was the reason it implemented the Seogun （military-first） policy. Moammar Gadhafi of Libya abandoned his nuclear development plan as the West required， and he ended up dead after losing his bearings against the West’s wanton bombing in Libya’s civil war. Gadhafi’s death further cemented the DPRK leadership’s determination to develop its nuclear capability. Although the process may be bumpy， the DPRK leaders and government will switch focus to economic construction and livelihood after the DPRK realizes its primary purpose.
The DPRK has shown some changes on domestic policy， institute setting， and construction plans since Kim came into power. These changes have attracted wide concerns， especially from Northeast Asian countries.
Kim iterated many times after assuming office that the country’s priority will be developing the economy. In June 2012， Kim declared establishing a new DPRK-style economic management system. In his New Year speech of 2013， Kim described the year ahead with words like “innovation” and “big turnaround，” stressing that the top task of the DPRK is economic construction. High-ranking officials like Vice Foreign Minister Pak Gil Yon laid stress on developing the economy at the UN assembly. Moreover， it was rumored that there could be a reform of the DPRK’s agricultural management system in the works. And DPRK high-ranking officials are attempting to concentrate economic management power in the cabinet. In the diplomatic field， Kim met more foreign guests， including ambassadors， more often than his father during the past year. And he frequently appeared in public accompanied by his wife Ri Sol Ju—a rare occasion among past leaders of the country.
Generally speaking， the DPRK is indeed trying to switch its policy focus from an emphasis on the military to boosting its economy through the introduction of a market system and conducting reform， innovation and opening-up. The recent nuclear test and last December’s missile launch made DPRK leaders feel much safer. They hope Western countries like the United States and Japan will realize they cannot control the DPRK， and instead turn to normalizing their relationship with Pyongyang. Speaking of innovation in his New Year address， Kim might realize a normalization of relations with the West by possessing nuclear capability， and follow up with economic expansion.
In fact， DPRK officials consider a military-first policy， space technology and nuclear development as essential in riding itself of a U.S. military threat， and also as the precondition for concentrating on economic growth.
Even at its worst times， the DPRK has never forgotten its economic construction and livelihood goals. In recent years， the DPRK has adopted a series of reform measures， showing an eager desire to further reform and development， especially after 2009.
‘Nuclear for peace’ strategy
The key to the DPRK’s “nuclear for peace” strategy is limitation and timing. The DPRK should not forget that a smaller country doesn’t have equal endurance regarding the same strategy of a bigger country. The rationality of the original intention of possessing nuclear weapons cannot cover the side effects and high cost. The worst side effect is that nuclear testing will damage the relationship between the DPRK and its most important neighbor， China. Uncertainties and turmoil during the process of acquiring nuclear capability will inevitably disturb China’s obtained and cherished peaceful development environment. And Chinese decisionmakers and the public worry about possible nuclear leaks. Besides， China fears the DPRK’s nuclear and space technology might be a hidden threat to China under unexpected circumstances.
After the recent nuclear test， the DPRK is faced with two options： one is to put exceeding resources into development of weapons of mass destruction； and the other is to stop at the right time to cement traditional relationships with China and Russia. It can use existing political and military strength and realize normalization of relationships with Washington and Tokyo through political measures， and turn to a focus of economic construction sooner. The second way is obviously a more practicable path for the original intention of going “nuclear for peace.” The DPRK is in a favorable environment for concentrating on economic development. China has basically completed its power shift. In Russia， Vladimir Putin， who consistently projects a hard exterior to the West， was reelected as president. And the DPRK’s strategic partnership with Russia has been solid. Washington and Tokyo have begun to adjust their Korean policy after realizing that the DPRK is too stable to overthrow.
The DPRK has cultivated many personnel to manage the economy after 10 years of sending talented people to study abroad. This provides good conditions for Kim to carry out economic development， reform and opening up.
Moreover， the country’s economy has generally recovered from the devastating blow brought on by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its energy and power industry is the first sector to recover. Plus， China is transferring power to the DPRK to fulfill its demands. The promoted power supply has created preconditions for reviving the country’s transportation and processing industries.
Considering the DPRK’s active behavior， China and other countries must exert measured pressure to prevent Pyongyang from sliding in the wrong direction. At the same time， they should attempt to defuse the DPRK’s anxiety about its security environment. The United States， Japan and the ROK must not carry out actions that could intensify or complicate matters. They must accept that regardless of the domestic situation in the DPRK， the result of the Korean War is as unchangeable as the result of World War II. The incoming Park Geun Hye administration should design more rational and workable policies in the region.
Analysis of the greater context shows that the primary purpose of possessing nuclear capability is not to wield nuclear power， nor to conquer the world， but to ensure a necessary external security environment to develop its economy.
Safety and economy
According to socialist political economic principles， a socialist economy must satisfy people’s material and cultural needs depending on a highly developed technological basis. However， a socialist country like the DPRK cannot concentrate fully on its own economic development strategy because of the tough external environment of Western economic blockades， or even the threat of military intervention.
In a legal sense， the Korean Peninsula has never ended its state of war since the truce with the United States and the Republic of Korea（ROK） in 1953. The DPRK felt great pressure from the West and the ROK after the dissolution of the Soviet Union， which was the reason it implemented the Seogun （military-first） policy. Moammar Gadhafi of Libya abandoned his nuclear development plan as the West required， and he ended up dead after losing his bearings against the West’s wanton bombing in Libya’s civil war. Gadhafi’s death further cemented the DPRK leadership’s determination to develop its nuclear capability. Although the process may be bumpy， the DPRK leaders and government will switch focus to economic construction and livelihood after the DPRK realizes its primary purpose.
The DPRK has shown some changes on domestic policy， institute setting， and construction plans since Kim came into power. These changes have attracted wide concerns， especially from Northeast Asian countries.
Kim iterated many times after assuming office that the country’s priority will be developing the economy. In June 2012， Kim declared establishing a new DPRK-style economic management system. In his New Year speech of 2013， Kim described the year ahead with words like “innovation” and “big turnaround，” stressing that the top task of the DPRK is economic construction. High-ranking officials like Vice Foreign Minister Pak Gil Yon laid stress on developing the economy at the UN assembly. Moreover， it was rumored that there could be a reform of the DPRK’s agricultural management system in the works. And DPRK high-ranking officials are attempting to concentrate economic management power in the cabinet. In the diplomatic field， Kim met more foreign guests， including ambassadors， more often than his father during the past year. And he frequently appeared in public accompanied by his wife Ri Sol Ju—a rare occasion among past leaders of the country.
Generally speaking， the DPRK is indeed trying to switch its policy focus from an emphasis on the military to boosting its economy through the introduction of a market system and conducting reform， innovation and opening-up. The recent nuclear test and last December’s missile launch made DPRK leaders feel much safer. They hope Western countries like the United States and Japan will realize they cannot control the DPRK， and instead turn to normalizing their relationship with Pyongyang. Speaking of innovation in his New Year address， Kim might realize a normalization of relations with the West by possessing nuclear capability， and follow up with economic expansion.
In fact， DPRK officials consider a military-first policy， space technology and nuclear development as essential in riding itself of a U.S. military threat， and also as the precondition for concentrating on economic growth.
Even at its worst times， the DPRK has never forgotten its economic construction and livelihood goals. In recent years， the DPRK has adopted a series of reform measures， showing an eager desire to further reform and development， especially after 2009.
‘Nuclear for peace’ strategy
The key to the DPRK’s “nuclear for peace” strategy is limitation and timing. The DPRK should not forget that a smaller country doesn’t have equal endurance regarding the same strategy of a bigger country. The rationality of the original intention of possessing nuclear weapons cannot cover the side effects and high cost. The worst side effect is that nuclear testing will damage the relationship between the DPRK and its most important neighbor， China. Uncertainties and turmoil during the process of acquiring nuclear capability will inevitably disturb China’s obtained and cherished peaceful development environment. And Chinese decisionmakers and the public worry about possible nuclear leaks. Besides， China fears the DPRK’s nuclear and space technology might be a hidden threat to China under unexpected circumstances.
After the recent nuclear test， the DPRK is faced with two options： one is to put exceeding resources into development of weapons of mass destruction； and the other is to stop at the right time to cement traditional relationships with China and Russia. It can use existing political and military strength and realize normalization of relationships with Washington and Tokyo through political measures， and turn to a focus of economic construction sooner. The second way is obviously a more practicable path for the original intention of going “nuclear for peace.” The DPRK is in a favorable environment for concentrating on economic development. China has basically completed its power shift. In Russia， Vladimir Putin， who consistently projects a hard exterior to the West， was reelected as president. And the DPRK’s strategic partnership with Russia has been solid. Washington and Tokyo have begun to adjust their Korean policy after realizing that the DPRK is too stable to overthrow.
The DPRK has cultivated many personnel to manage the economy after 10 years of sending talented people to study abroad. This provides good conditions for Kim to carry out economic development， reform and opening up.
Moreover， the country’s economy has generally recovered from the devastating blow brought on by the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Its energy and power industry is the first sector to recover. Plus， China is transferring power to the DPRK to fulfill its demands. The promoted power supply has created preconditions for reviving the country’s transportation and processing industries.
Considering the DPRK’s active behavior， China and other countries must exert measured pressure to prevent Pyongyang from sliding in the wrong direction. At the same time， they should attempt to defuse the DPRK’s anxiety about its security environment. The United States， Japan and the ROK must not carry out actions that could intensify or complicate matters. They must accept that regardless of the domestic situation in the DPRK， the result of the Korean War is as unchangeable as the result of World War II. The incoming Park Geun Hye administration should design more rational and workable policies in the region.