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本文以委托代理理论为基础分析框架,选取我国沪深两市A股上市公司2010—2015年的数据为样本,考察董事长与CEO共事时长以及薪酬激励对组织绩效的影响。结果发现:CEO与董事长共事时长以及薪酬激励均与组织绩效正相关;在非国有控股公司中,薪酬激励对组织绩效的影响作用更强。在高市场化水平地区,CEO与董事长共事时长以及薪酬激励对组织绩效的影响作用更强。
Based on the principal-agent theory, this paper chooses the data of A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen from 2010 to 2015 as an example to examine the influence of CEO-CEO co-operation time and salary incentive on organizational performance. The result shows that CEO’s working time with CEO and salary incentive are both positively correlated with organizational performance. In non-state-controlled companies, compensation incentive has a stronger effect on organizational performance. In a high-marketization level, CEO engagement with the chairman of the board and pay incentives have a stronger effect on organizational performance.