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当前,我国的股市的表现形式一般是以多家市场企业及单位之间博弈互动为主。本文笔者根据对上市公司与股民之间的博弈为主体,通过对其动静态的结合展开重点分析,从而分析股市在不同的监管条件中可能造成博弈均衡情况出现的因素。分析结果说明,不论是哪种监管方式,只要在其程度完备时,其股民与上市公司之间的投机性是会产生互动关系的,进而彼此影响。而其中,整体层面性的投机均衡情况出现几率和这种均衡出现的原因,则取决于股市在最初时的情况,以及对其监管的完备程度。
At present, the performance of the stock market in our country is mainly based on the game interaction among many market enterprises and units. According to the game between listed companies and investors, the writer analyzes the dynamic equilibrium between stock market and stock market, and analyzes the factors which may cause the game equilibrium in different regulatory conditions. The result of the analysis shows that no matter what kind of regulatory approach, as long as its degree is complete, the speculative nature of its investors and listed companies will have an interactive relationship and further influence each other. Among them, the overall level of opportunistic equilibrium probability of occurrence and the reasons for this equilibrium depends on the stock market in the initial situation, as well as its supervision of the degree of completion.