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论文在Besley和Coate的团体贷款经典模型基础上,从社会资本视角,将内部监督、社会惩罚及企业产出相互关系三个重要维度纳入综合分析模型,基于此综合模型讨论了可能影响团体贷款还款博弈的各因素的相互作用效果,较为系统地分析了中小企业团体贷款的还款问题,探讨了如何防止由于借贷双方信息不对称引起的策略性违约。
Based on the classic model of group lending by Besley and Coate, from the perspective of social capital, the dissertation incorporates three important dimensions of internal oversight, social punishment and the interrelationship between enterprise output into a comprehensive analysis model. Based on this comprehensive model, The interaction between the various factors of the game, a more systematic analysis of the SME group loans repayment issues, discussed how to prevent due to the asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders caused by strategic default.