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基于银行债权人缺失的视角,研究了零杠杆政策是否会加重上市公司的非效率投资。由于银行债权人的缺失,采用零杠杆政策会产生更加严重的信息不对称和代理问题,而信息不对称和代理问题正是影响投资效率的两个主要因素。实证研究也表明,零杠杆政策确实会通过加重信息不对称和代理问题而增加上市公司的非效率投资。考虑到不同的监督机制之间可能存在一定的替代作用,进一步研究发现,随着其他外部监督作用的增强,公司治理水平不断提高,零杠杆政策由于银行债权人缺失对非效率投资的影响会逐渐减弱。
Based on the lack of bank creditors, we study whether the zero-leverage policy will aggravate the inefficient investment of listed companies. Due to the lack of bank creditors, using zero leverage policy will lead to more serious information asymmetry and agency problems, and information asymmetry and agency issues are the two main factors that affect the efficiency of investment. Empirical studies also show that zero leverage policy does increase the inefficient investment of listed companies by aggravating the information asymmetry and agency problems. Considering that there may be some substitution between different oversight mechanisms, further research finds that with the enhancement of other external oversight functions, the level of corporate governance continues to improve. The effect of zero-leverage policy on inefficient investment will gradually diminish due to the lack of bank creditors .