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以中国上市公司为研究对象,考察负债融资及债权人对大股东自利行为与管理者代理行为的影响,从而揭示中国上市公司中债权人抑制大股东和管理者自利行为的动机。利用中国上市公司的数据,实证检验了企业流动性较好时,负债融资对大股东自利行为和管理层代理行为的影响,并揭示了中国上市公司中股东—债权人冲突和负债作为治理机制所带来的经济后果。实证结果表明,当企业流动性较差时,负债融资对大股东自利行为和管理者代理行为有显著抑制作用。当企业流动性较好时,负债融资对大股东自利行为和管理层代理行为无显著抑制作用。
Taking Chinese listed companies as the research object, this paper investigates the impact of debt financing and creditors on the self-interest behavior of the major shareholders and the agency behavior of the managers, revealing the motivation of the creditors in Chinese listed companies to curb the self-interest of major shareholders and managers. Using the data of Chinese listed companies, this paper empirically tests the impact of debt financing on the self-interested behavior and management agency behavior of large shareholders when the corporate liquidity is good, and reveals that the shareholder-creditor conflict and liability in Chinese listed companies are the mechanism of governance The economic consequences. The empirical results show that, when the firm liquidity is poor, debt financing has a significant inhibitory effect on the self-serving behavior of major shareholders and agency behavior of managers. When the corporate liquidity is better, debt financing has no significant inhibitory effect on the self-interest behavior and management agency behavior of the major shareholders.