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针对由单个处于领导地位的汽车制造商和单个作为跟随者的汽车租赁商组成的租赁供应链,分析了租赁商资金不足对租赁供应链的影响。在完全信息下,运用Stackelberg博弈理论分别对租赁供应链在两种融资模式下的博弈模型进行分析,给出了制造商与租赁商的最优决策。证明了租赁商选择内部融资可以增加汽车订购量,提高租赁收益。研究显示集中控制决策下制造商选择内部融资模式比外部融资模式更优。最后运用数值算例验证了研究结论。
For the leasing supply chain consisting of a single leading car manufacturer and a single car rental operator as followers, the effect of insufficient leasing money on the leasing supply chain was analyzed. Under the complete information, Stackelberg game theory is used to analyze the game model of leasing supply chain under the two financing modes respectively, and the optimal decision of manufacturer and renter is given. It proves that choosing the internal financing of the leasing business can increase the car ordering quantity and increase the rental income. The research shows that manufacturers choose the internal financing mode under the centralized control decision-making than the external financing mode. Finally, numerical examples are used to verify the conclusion.