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以绿色施工激励机制为研究对象,运用委托-代理理论基本原理,分析了绿色施工管理过程中政府与施工企业间的利益关系,侧重分析了作为委托人的政府与作为代理人的施工企业在是否实施绿色施工问题上的理性水平差异,以及由此决定的双方在行为选择上的不同。本文通过构建委托-代理模型,政府可以相应改变对绿色施工企业的激励机制,不仅可以使得施工企业的努力水平发生变化,还能使得两者的信息不对称格局发生改变,同时达到帕累托最优,即在最大程度上调动施工企业实施绿色施工的积极性。
Taking the green construction incentive mechanism as the research object and the principal of the principal-agent theory, this paper analyzes the relationship between the government and construction enterprises in the process of green construction management, focusing on the analysis of whether the government as the principal and the construction enterprise as the agent Differences in the level of rationality in implementing green construction issues and the consequent differences in the choice of behavior between the two parties. By constructing the principal-agent model, the government can correspondingly change the incentive mechanism for green construction enterprises, which not only can change the level of efforts of construction enterprises, but also change the pattern of information asymmetry between the two, Excellent, that is, to mobilize the enthusiasm of construction enterprises to implement green construction to the maximum extent.