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鉴于轨道交通工程施工单位在安全投入上存在与安全监管部门之间的博弈关系,建立施工单位与监管部门之间的博弈模型,分析博弈模型的基本假设条件、监管成本、监管部门被惩罚期望值、不进行安全投入社会损失期望值、施工单位安全投入以及不进行安全投入单位损失期望值对博弈结论的影响,最终得出了4条影响施工单位进行安全投入的关键结论,并在此基础上,提出了我国轨道交通工程建设安全监管对策。
In view of the game investment between safety construction department and safety supervision department, the establishment of the game model between construction unit and supervision department, analysis of the basic assumptions of the game model, the cost of supervision, the expectation of the supervision department being punished, Without the expectation of social loss of safety investment, safety investment of construction unit and expectation of failure of safety investment unit, this paper concludes the four key conclusions that affect the safety investment of construction units, and on the basis of which, Safety Supervision Countermeasures of China Rail Transit Construction.