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在当代形而上学理论中,大卫·刘易斯的对应体理论和模态实在论因违反直观常识而备受争议。刘易斯将个体在时间中的持存理解为分存而非整存,将时间中持存的个体理解为相的聚合,而相就是个体在每个存在时刻的瞬时部分,这和他将个体理解为每个世界中的限界个体如出一辙。通过把背景置于刘易斯的整个系统哲学,对刘易斯“休谟式的随附论”、分存论的个体理论和永恒论的时间观等形而上学立场进行详细分析,将时态和模态进行类比,可以发现其在可能世界与时间参数的理解上、在对跨时间持存问题与跨界同一问题的处理方案上、在模态实在论和对应体理论与时态实在论的论证理路上存在一致性,这彰显了其理论的相互支持和系统性,有助于“同情地理解”刘易斯的形而上学理论。
In contemporary metaphysical theory, David Lewis’s counterpart theory and modal realism are controversial for violating common sense. Lewis interprets the individual’s holding in time as a parting rather than an entire stock, and the individual holding in time is understood as the aggregation of phases, and the phase is the instantaneous part of the individual in each moment of existence, which is similar to his understanding of the individual For each bound in the world exactly the same individual. By placing context in Lewis’s entire system philosophy, we analyze in detail the metaphysical positions such as Lewis’s Hume’s Theory of Attachment, the individual theory of existentialism, and the time view of eternal theory, Analogy, it can be found in the understanding of the possible world and time parameters, in dealing with the problem of cross-temporal persistence and cross-border treatment of the same problem, in the modal realism and the corresponding theory and the theory of the realism of the time There is consistency, which demonstrates Lewis’s metaphysical theory of mutual support and systematicness of his theory, which helps to “comprehend sympathetically.”