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现如今越来越多的企业为了提高公司的绩效对高管及员工采取股权激励的方式,但与此同时带来的往往是一系列公司利益主体的变动。从理论分析来看,股权激励可作为稳定公司高管人员的一种长期激励方式,通常被认为是解决委托—代理矛盾的首要机制。在我国资本市场体系不断完善的背景下,已有越来越多的公司在经济管理过程中采用高管股权激励的方式来对管理层与公司股东之间的利益矛盾进行协调。本文基于上述背景,结合实例,对高管股权激励对公司高管的行为以及公司绩效的影响作了分析,以期能为公司管理提供借鉴。
Nowadays, more and more enterprises adopt the way of equity incentive to executives and employees in order to improve the performance of the company. However, at the same time, they bring about a series of changes in the interests of the company. From the theoretical analysis, equity incentive can be used as a long-term incentive to stabilize the senior management of the company, and is generally considered as the primary mechanism to solve the contradiction between principal-agent. Under the background of continuous improvement of capital market system in our country, more and more companies have adopted the method of executive stock option incentive in the process of economic management to coordinate the conflicts of interest between the management and the shareholders of the company. Based on the above background, this paper analyzes the impact of executive stock option incentive on the performance of senior executives and corporate performance based on the above background, with a view to providing reference for corporate governance.