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文章采用博弈理论研究了财政分权下中央及地方政府实现经济增长的策略分析,分别构造了中央政府与地方政府之间的博弈模型以及地方政府与地方政府之间的博弈模型。由中央政府与地方政府之间的模型分析可知,如果地方政府与中央政府的目标函数不一致,地方政府最优投资总量就会高于中央政府的意愿投资总量。并且地方政府投资所达到的经济增长无法实现中央政府预想的经济增长度。由地方政府与地方政府之间的模型分析可知,地方政府双方合作时使得收益最大、投资最小,这种“双赢”的合作应该是他们的最佳选择。
This paper studies the strategic analysis of the central and local governments’ economic growth under the fiscal decentralization, and constructs the game model between the central government and the local government and the game model between the local government and the local government. From the model analysis between central government and local government, we can see that if the objective function of local government and central government is inconsistent, the optimal total investment of local government will be higher than the total investment of central government. And the economic growth achieved by local government investment fails to achieve the level of economic growth envisioned by the central government. According to the model analysis between local government and local government, we can see that the cooperation between local governments maximizes returns and minimizes investment, and this “win-win” cooperation should be their best choice.