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地方政府土地违法具有阶段性周期反弹的趋势特征、东部比重降低而中西部比重上升的空间特征以及组织层级越高、大面积违法越严重的主体特征。基于中央—地方土地违法监察的完全信息静态博弈模型,分析发现地方政府土地违法行为与土地监察机制、政绩考核制度和财政体制密切相关,既有土地财政与官员晋升制度提供的内在激励,也有违法成本低与权力制约失衡的制度软约束,是既定制度安排下中央—地方博弈的产物。
Local government illegal land with periodic cyclical rebound trend characteristics, reduce the proportion of the eastern part of the central and western proportion of the spatial characteristics of the rise and the higher the level of organization, the more serious large-scale violations of the main characteristics. Based on the complete information static game model of the Central and Local Land Illegal Supervision, it is found that the local government land violations are closely related to the land monitoring mechanism, performance evaluation system and financial system. Both the internal incentives provided by the land finance and official promotion system and the illegal The soft constraint of the system with low cost and power restriction unbalanced is the product of the central-local game under the established system arrangement.