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起源于美国的股票期权激励制度是一种旨在解决企业委托代理矛盾的长期激励计划。其核心是将管理层的个人收益和广大股东的收益,尤其是长期利益统一起来,从而使股东价值成为管理层决策行为的准则。股票期权的本意是通过经营者经营能力——公司业绩——股票价格——高层管理人员回报,建立一套科学的激励制度。但实践中,实施的效果却大相径庭。说明简单地认为管理层持股有助于改善企业业绩的观点有失偏颇。本文认为,在中国当前的管理体制下,实施股票期权时,在经营者经营能力的衡量,公司业绩的评价,股票价格的确定机制等方面都存在缺陷,因此股票期权在中国实行必须符合中国国情,必须根据中国的具体情况进行完善和改进。
The stock option incentive system originated in the United States is a long-term incentive plan designed to solve the contradictions of the principal-agent in the enterprise. Its core is the management of personal income and the majority of shareholders, especially the long-term interests of unification, so that the value of shareholder management decision-making behavior of the guidelines. The original intention of the stock option is to set up a set of scientific incentive system through the management ability of the operator - company performance - stock price - return of top management. However, in practice, the effect of implementation is very different. Explain that there is a misconduct in the simple view that management’s shareholding helps to improve business performance. This paper argues that under the current management system in China, the implementation of stock options in the management of the ability to measure the company’s performance evaluation, the stock price determination mechanism and so there are flaws, so the implementation of stock options in China must comply with China’s national conditions Must be perfected and improved according to China’s specific conditions.