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考虑专业治污公司为中小企业进行污染物治理的情况下,中小企业委托研发机构进行减排技术创新,政府则对该创新活动进行补贴,通过构建中小企业、研发机构及政府间协同创新博弈模型,研究了中小企业委托研发机构进行减排技术创新的策略和政府补贴政策.通过理论和仿真分析得出了中小企业减排创新和政府进行补贴的条件,以及中小企业和政府的最优策略.研究表明,当研发机构创新能力较弱或治污公司单位治污收费较低,中小企业不愿进行创新时,政府可以通过补贴中小企业,促使其进行减排创新,进而提高社会福利.
Considering that professional pollution control companies manage pollutants for small and medium-sized enterprises, SMEs entrust R & D institutions to make technological innovations in emission reduction while the government subsidizes such innovative activities. By building small and medium-sized enterprises, R & D institutions and inter-governmental collaborative innovation game model , Studied the strategy of small and medium-sized enterprises commissioned R & D institutions to carry out technological innovation of emission reduction and government subsidy policy.The conditions of SMEs emission reduction innovation and government subsidies, as well as the optimal strategies of SMEs and government were obtained through theoretical and simulation analysis. The research shows that when R & D institutions have weak innovation ability or pollution control companies charge low pollution and SMEs are unwilling to innovate, the government can subsidize SMEs to promote their emission reduction innovation and then improve their social welfare.