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主流的财政分权理论一般认为,通过“用手投票”和“用脚投票”两种机制可以提高教育、卫生、社会保障等方面的社会福利水平,本文将这一理论应用于1978年以来的财政分权改革与中国小学义务教育的案例,发现财政分权并没有增加小学义务教育的有效供给。本文认为,出现这一结果的内在机制是,西方通行的财政分权促进社会福利水平提高的两种机制在中国并不成立,尤其是人口流动障碍及其地区性差异导致地方政府行为向追求资本投资与经济增长率的方向转变,这导致各地区激烈的财政竞争并相应挤占了义务教育等外部性较强的准公共产品性质的财政支出。本文还发现财政分权对富裕地区与贫困地区经济增长的影响是不一样的,它推动了富裕地区的经济增长而抑制了后者。
The mainstream theory of fiscal decentralization generally holds that this mechanism can be applied to social welfare in education, health and social security through “voting by hand” and “voting by foot.” This paper applies this theory to the social welfare system since 1978 The case of fiscal decentralization reform and compulsory primary education in China found that fiscal decentralization did not increase the effective supply of compulsory primary education. This paper argues that the underlying mechanism of this result is that the two mechanisms by which fiscal decentralization in the West promotes the improvement of social welfare are not established in China. In particular, the barriers to population mobility and their regional differences have led to the shift from local government to the pursuit of capital investment And the direction of economic growth rate, which led to fierce financial competition in various regions and correspondingly squeezed the fiscal expenditures on the nature of quasi-public goods with strong externalities such as compulsory education. The paper also finds that the fiscal decentralization has a different impact on the economic growth in the affluent areas and in the impoverished areas. It has promoted the economic growth in the affluent areas and suppressed the latter.