名字(和其他初始的东西)如何与其指谓相联系,这种经典的观点在许多方面是极其难以置信的(比如,它说你可以仅仅指谓可以从“逻辑专门的”初始符号定义的事物;它要求有这样一些陈述,比如“如果西塞罗存在,那么西塞罗痛斥喀提林”,它们在某种意义上是分析的,即它们是由语言学规则保证的并且不受未来发现的修正)。在塔尔斯基写作的时候,这种经典理论是唯一可以得到的理论,我猜测,由于这一理论的困难,因此塔尔斯基的虚假理论DE和DC似乎是有道理的——它们并不令人激动,但是如果你想要某种令人激动的东西,你就得到逻辑专名。任何解释语词与它们所涉及的事物的企图都一定不可避免地要么导致一种非常不可能的理论(像罗素的理论),要么导致一种平凡的理论(像塔尔斯基的理论),这种判断今天似乎仍然得到广泛接受。但是我认为,最近几年来,随着克里普克和其他一些人的因果指谓理论的发展,这种判断已经变得不那么有道理了。根据这样的理论,对于“西塞罗”指谓西塞罗和“μ介子”适用于从介子这些事实,应该以西塞罗(μ介子)和我们关于“西塞罗”(“μ介子”)的使用之间的某种因果网络来解释:即具有某种社会性质的(“西塞罗”这个词从这个名字的原初使用者传到我们,或者“μ介子”这个词从物理学家传给普通人)和具有 How the name (and other initial things) relate to its claim is in many ways a classic belief that is incredible (for example, it says you can simply refer to something that can be defined by a “logically specialized” initial symbol ; It requires statements such as “If Cicero was present then Cicero denounced Katerin,” which is analyzed in a sense that they are guaranteed by linguistic rules and are not subject to future discovery Amendment). This classic theory was the only theory available at Tarski’s writing, and I suspect that Tarski’s falsification theory of DE and DC seemed to make sense because of the difficulty of the theory - and they Not exciting, but if you want something exciting, you get the logical name. Any attempt to explain words and the things they involve must inevitably lead either to a very unlikely theory (like Russell’s theory) or to a trivial theory (like Tarski’s theory), which Judgments seem to be still widely accepted today. But in my opinion, this judgment has become less plausible in recent years with the development of the theory of causality in Kripke and others. According to such a theory, for Cicero and the fact that “muon” applies to meson, Cicero (muon) and ours should be based on our knowledge of “Cicero” (“muon”) (Ie the word “Cicero” is passed on to us from the original user of the name, or the term “muon” is translated from a physicist’s account To ordinary people) and has