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为了研究关联担保隧道效应行为,本文推导了控股股东通过关联担保追求隐性收益的公式,分析投资效率、应收项目和关联担保的关系。实证结果表明,只与控股股东关联担保上市公司和只与子公司、参股公司关联担保上市公司,其控股股东都通过关联担保获得了隐性收益,说明上市公司关联担保偏好的原因主要来自资金侵占而非控制权掠夺。
In order to study the effect of the related guarantee tunnel effect, this paper derives the formula that the controlling shareholder pursues the hidden benefit through the related guarantee, and analyzes the relationship between investment efficiency, receivables and related guarantee. The empirical results show that the listed companies that are related to controlling shareholders only and the listed companies that are affiliated with subsidiaries and joint-stock companies and their controlling shareholders all obtain hidden income through the related guarantee. The reasons for the preference of listed companies for related guarantee mainly come from the capital encroachment Instead of controlling the plunder.