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为验证股权分置改革后大股东对资产置换中资产评估价格是否存在操纵,以2007-2015年进行资产置换并披露评估报告的样本进行研究。发现资产置换事件的发生并未对未来的经营绩效产生明显的正面影响;同时,大股东存在操纵资产评估价格的行为,其中大股东持股比例与资产评估增值率存在显著负相关关系,说明这种操纵行为是以利益协同为主导下发生的;另外发现当资产评估公司为“五大”时,资产评估增值率较低。结果表明,大股东在资产置换中有动机和能力操纵评价价格,应扩大资产评估机构的规模、提高其独立性,从而抑制大股东对价格的操纵。
In order to verify whether the major shareholder has manipulated the asset valuation price in the asset swap after the non-tradable share reform, a sample of assets replacement and disclosure assessment report from 2007 to 2015 was conducted. Found that the occurrence of assets replacement event did not have a clear positive impact on future business performance; the same time, the existence of large shareholders to manipulate the asset valuation of the price behavior, in which the proportion of large shareholders and assets appraisal value-added rate there is a significant negative correlation, indicating that this The manipulative behavior is based on the synergy of interests. In addition, it is found that when the assets appraisal company is “Big Five”, the appreciation rate of assets appraisal is lower. The results show that the major shareholders have the motivation and ability to manipulate the evaluation price in the asset replacement. The scale of the asset evaluation institution should be expanded to improve its independence so as to restrain the manipulation of the price by majority shareholders.