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专利许可在某种程度上可以寻求鼓励创新和减少净损失之间的折中,提高资源配置效率。本文基于Hotelling模型,考虑产品价格变化对消费者需求的影响,构建了一个三阶段博弈模型,结果显示:消费者的需求变化、产品市场的竞争程度、创新的大小、创新市场上的竞争程度都会影响到创新激励、消费者剩余和社会福利水平。因而,创新方应当综合分析各种因素,确定使自身利润最大化的许可策略;决策机构应当从许可的本身特征出发,系统分析许可策略的内在机制,在不损害消费者剩余的前提下,提高技术交易效率,促进技术扩散,最大化社会福利。
To some extent, patent licensing can seek to compromise between encouraging innovation and reducing net loss and improving the efficiency of resource allocation. Based on the Hotelling model and considering the impact of product price changes on consumer demand, a three-stage game model is constructed. The results show that consumer demand, product market competition, innovation size and innovation market competition Affect innovation incentives, consumer surplus and social welfare. Therefore, the innovation side should comprehensively analyze various factors and determine the licensing strategy that maximizes its own profit. The decision-making organ should systematically analyze the inherent mechanism of the licensing strategy based on the characteristics of the license and improve the system without prejudice to the consumer’s surplus Efficiency of technology transactions, promotion of technology diffusion and maximization of social welfare.