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采用清洁发展机制下碳排放总量限制的减排政策时,企业吸引投资者对减排方面的相关技术和设备的投资非常重要。由于企业和投资者之间信息的不对称,投资者无法判断企业是高收益企业还是低收益企业。基于此,本文构建了企业和投资者之间的信号传递博弈模型,结果表明,企业用自身收益的一定比例换取投资者对新上项目的投资,对低收益企业的投资概率要大于高收益企业;在不区分企业收益情况下,进而研究了达到预期减排目标的企业和投资者之间的混同完美贝叶斯均衡策略,为投资者的投资决策提供了参考依据。
When adopting emission reduction policies that limit the total amount of carbon emissions under the CDM, it is important that companies attract investors to invest in technologies and equipment that reduce emissions. Because of the asymmetric information between business and investors, investors can not judge whether a business is a high-income company or a low-income business. Based on this, this paper constructs a signaling game model between enterprises and investors. The results show that enterprises invest a certain proportion of their own proceeds in exchange for investors’ investment in new projects, and the investment probability of low-yield enterprises is greater than that of high-yield enterprises . Without making a distinction between business returns, we study the perfect Bayesian equilibrium strategy between firms and investors that achieve the expected emission reduction targets, which provides a reference for investors’ investment decisions.