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When two powerful parties are engaged in a battle with each other， who will win？
The said battle was initiated by China’s National Development and Reform Commission （NDRC）， a political body of a sovereign country. Its opponent is Qualcomm， the absolute leader in the global mobile chip industry. On February 19， Xu Kunlin， director of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly at the NDRC， said in a press conference that the NDRC had already initiated an investigation into Qualcomm’s sole price fixing in the mobile chief field.
According to Xu Kunlin， those suing against Qualcomm’s monopolization are the relevant enterprises and industrial associations. They reported that Qualcomm， a company from the U.S.， abused its dominant place in the standards-essential patents of wireless communication and the mobile chip market to carry out the sole price fixing， including the unfairly high price， discriminatory price and unreasonable add-ons of terms of exchange.
This was the first time that the NDRC spoke about the case after the start of the investigation three months before that.
Before and After the “Assault”
On November 19， 2013， Shen Jin， Global Vice President of Qualcomm’s business development， was asked in his Microblog about Qualcomm’s contracts with terminal suppliers in the 4G market.
“In the test purchasing of China Mobile’s LTE project， the devices with Qualcomm’s chipsets always ranked among the top in the number. I believe that the most of 4G terminals that earliest come into the market will use Qualcomm’s chipsets，” he answered.
The answer showed Qualcomm’s confidence， as well as its power and market share. However， it also unintentionally placed Qualcomm under the anti-monopoly investigation. After this Microblog-based interview， the NDRC’s anti-monopoly investigators paid a surprise visit to Qualcomm’s offices in Beijing and Shanghai.
A source witnessing the investigations said that the investigators took away the digital copies of Qualcomm’s documents in price and market. They also threw a series of questions at Qualcomm about the price of its chips and the anti-monopoly investigation Qualcomm encountered in other countries.
Qualcomm is required to explain to the NDRC about how the prices of chips and relevant technologies are fixed in China and what kinds of cost were included. Meanwhile， they need to detail how and why the prices were changed in the past years. The second questions showed NDRC’s purpose of knowing what questions Qualcomm met in the anti-monopoly investigations in Japan， Korea and Korea. In that process， Qualcomm， as well as the observers， did not get the main investigation direction of the NDRC. It could only figure out that the investigation might be around the “abuse of dominant place in the market” stipulated in the third act of Anti-Monopoly Law based on the questions NDRC raised.
Both parties kept silent for a long while after the unexpected “investigation”. However， outsiders could still look into the case based on the product features， sales pattern of Qualcomm and the analysis of the market situation.
At present， Qualcomm is undoubtedly standing at the top of the mobile chip design in the world. In the 3G era， the massive 3G standards led by Qualcomm helped this company get a lot of fundamental patents in the CDMA field. Therefore， most of the chip manufacturers and device makers had to pay “patent commissions” for Qualcomm as long as they produce the 3G devices. On the other hand， Qualcomm is unmatched in the development and integration as it could provide the chip solutions for all 3G and 4G systems.
Qualcomm has been the champion in the mobile chip market for six straight years since 2007. The list of its clients covers Apple， Samsung， HTC， as well as Chinese domestic mobile phone makers like K-Touch， ZTE， Lenovo and Huawei. No other companies could compete with Qualcomm in that field. In the 3G mobile phone market of China， Qualcomm takes about 40% shares.
This leading position is to be further enhanced by the approaching 4G age. This saying is supported by the sound proof that Qualcomm’s chips took 60% of the TDD devices purchased by China Mobile in the second quarter of 2013.
“4G is not an independent being. It needs to be integrated with 2G， 3G and other wireless communication technologies. Therefore， in the 4G era， Qualcomm’s competitiveness is further improved，” said an observer.
According to the data from the domestic mobile phone manufacturers in China， Qualcomm collects the patent commission that accounts for 5% of the prices of the mobile phones compatible with five communication patterns and ten frequencies. These devices are now the most common devices in the 4G field. In addition， Qualcomm also collects the fees of chip design and others， allowing the company to take 20% of the sales price away from every 4G mobile phone sold in the future. In comparison， most of the Chinese mobile phone makers’ net profits only account for 5% of their total sales， further rendering the cost of chips unbearable.” Different from the intellectual property disputes between Huawei and IDC， which were ended one month earlier than the investigation into Qualcomm after being moved from the U.S. to China， Qualcomm’s opponent is lurking in the dark， waiting for the opportunities to throw the dart.
“The suitors are probably the mobile phone makers. That’s because， a）， it is very unlikely for the mobile phone makers to defeat Qualcomm through lawsuits in the court； and b）， the public litigation might ruin these companies’ relations with Qualcomm，” an insider speculated.
The price fixing of enterprises is actually very complicated. Therefore， it is hard to find the proofs to directly sue against the price fixing of Qualcomm. On the other hand， Qualcomm’s unshakeable leading position in the chips of smartphones cut the possibility of Chinese device makers， especially the smaller ones， to find an alternate supplier. Under that condition， it is a reasonable choice for these companies to turn to the NDRC， hoping to use the administrative force to keep Qualcomm at bay.
The Legal Stance
Even though the anti-monopoly investigation into Qualcomm has a complicated background， the legal rules and relations involved in this case are quite simple.
All the NDRC needs is to “confirm Qualcomm’s dominant position in the mobile chip market” and find the proof of “Qualcomm’s abusing of this dominance”， with which clear supporting clauses could be found in the third chapter of AntiMonopoly Law of China.
The previous words are enough to confirm the “dominant place of Qualcomm”. Now the problem remains with the“abuse of the dominance”.
The case of Huawei’s suing against IDC settled before the investigation provided necessary references and experiences. In October 2013， the Supreme Court of Guangdong adjudged the monopolization of IDC and asked the U.S. company to compensate Huawei with 20 million yuan.
Like the Qualcomm case， the suit between Huawei and IDC was also related to the communication products， standards-essential patents and the patent owners’ abuse of the dominance. The legal standards the Guangdong Supreme Court used in the Huawei-IDC case could be used as an important reference for the NDRC to deal with Qualcomm.
The legal experts once published a review about the Huawei-IDC case， in which they stated that the definition of the “relevant market”， according to the Anti-Monopoly Law， mainly depends whether – and how easily – can the products and services be replaced in the market. When the patents are combined with the technological standards， the operators are necessarily to apply some requirements for technologies and patents for the sake of the standards. The formation of the standards means that the product manufacturers are forced to use some certain patents， cutting the passage to the patent evasion. In the Huawei-IDC case， a conclusion could be made： the each of the standardsessential patents owners’essential patent-licensed market in the 3G wireless communication standards – WCDMA， CDMA2000， TD-SCDMA – in China and the U.S. is considered to be an independent relevant market， and the general relevant market is the agglomeration of these independent markets.
Therefore， the judges in Guangdong thought that the patent owners usually took the powerful positions during the negotiations with the patent licensees about licensing the patents. The fair market competition are impaired when the patent owners make use of their powerful positions to force the licensees to accept the conditions that might greatly impact their own interest and the patent licensees can turn to the legal method for self salvation.
In the Huawei-IDC case， the judge believe that the patent owner – IDC – has the absolute market share in every essential patent-licensed market concerning the 3G standard and they have the ability to hinder or affect the other operators’ access to the market. These granted IDC the power to control the price fixing of the 3Grelated essential patents and others， a must precondition for the “dominance in the market”.
As for the “abuse” part， the judges thought that it could happen when the two parties – the patent owners and patent licensees – are mismatched in the information concerning the patents during the negotiation. The laws require the patent owners to be fair， reasonable and without discrimination during the patent licensing negotiation and licensing agreements.
The ultimate foundation to see to the fairness， reasonability and non-discrimination is the price of patent pricing. In the Huawei-IDC case， the price IDC asks Apple and Samsung for using its patents is much lower than the one it asks Huawei to pay， meaning that unreasonable and discriminatory pricing could be found during the negotiation. In addition， IDC forced Huawei to grant it with the license to use Huawei’s own patents for free to gather extra profits， which was another proof for its malpractice in that case.
The anti-monopoly investigation into Qualcomm might be complicated than the Huawei-IDC case since Qualcomm not only licenses its patents， but also sells chips. This brings the shipping volume of Qualcomm into consideration when it comes to its abuse of the dominance in the market.
The Three Levels of Confrontation
In the investigation into Qualcomm， the NDRC could easily find supporting proofs to punish the U.S. company for its monopolization under the current legal frame. However， the Anti-Monopoly Law is considered to be a Damocles sword， which is the scariest when it suspends over someone’s head. The conflicts between NDRC and Qualcomm are fermenting and developing behind the uneventful surface. The NDRC just revealed a few facts that were said to be the proofs for Qualcomm’s monopolization and stated that the investigation was still going on with the punishment far from being available at this moment.
Actually， after the sudden assault last November， NDRC and Qualcomm only had a face-to-face confrontation once – on December 20， Qualcomm’s senior executives answered to the NDRC’s call of inquiry. According to a source， different from IDC which had promised to make changes， Qualcomm was quite determined. “That meeting featured communication with Qualcomm’s promise to cooperate during the negotiation. However， it did not mention anything about changes.”
Then the two parties never met each other till now. The announcement of NDRC that includes the sample of IDC might be a “hint” or even “warning” it delivered to Qualcomm.
In experts’ opinions， the tentative and steady progress in the investigation is actually a process in which both sides keep“losing blood”. If the potential interest or loss is counted in， the punishment of multi-million U.S. dollars – the highest amount according to the Anti-Monopoly Law – is nothing compared with entire 4G market of China in the future.
The first level of this confrontation rests with the terminal makers， especially those domestic mobile phone manufacturers clinging to the low- and medium-end market.
If Qualcomm wants to evade the punishment， the best way is to show its “sincerity” like IDC and lower the price of its chips and patent licensing. This could greatly lower the cost for domestic mobile phone makers， allowing them to stay closely behind Apple and Samsung at the beginning of the 4G era. However， most of the mobile phone companies in China are in short of innovation ability and core patents， rendering them powerful in the deal with Qualcomm， a supplier that they cannot get rid of easily.
The second level is related with the market shares of the three major telecom operators in China， as well as the strategic development of China’s communication industry.
Those following the leading standards will be the winner in the competition. This has been a solid rule in China’s communication industry in the past 2G and 3G era. In the 2G era， China Mobile and China Unicom followed the GSM network which was fixed by the European Telecom Standard Association while China Telecom adopted the CDMA network developed by the U.S. counterpart. In the 3G era， China developed TD-SCDMA standard， which was licensed to China Mobile for the convenience of promoting the standard with more self-owned patents. China Unicom followed the WCDMA developed by Europe while China Telecom turned to CDMA 2000 from the U.S. However， the TD-SCDMA is far behind WCDMA and CDMA200 in terms of the technological maturation. As a result， China Mobile， the once overlord of the telecom market in China， lost a lot of market to its competitors.
“After realizing its unconquerable defect in the 3G field， China Mobile began the distribution in the 4G network and base stations very early，” an insider of China Mobile said.
In the 4G era， the standards fall into two camps： the FDD and TDD. The two have no apparent gap in the technology. FDD is quite common in European and American countries while TDD owns more Chinese enterprises’ patents. On December 4， China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technologies issued the 4G licenses. The three telecom operators were allowed to apply the TDD network at that time.
The Chinese government did this for “keeping the statesponsored technological standard ahead for a while”， even though the official reply was that it was not the right time to issue the FDD license.
The uncertainty in the market shifted the expectation for products suiting the FDD standards to the demand for the TDD-compatible devices. Since Chinese chip makers – and some other foreign companies – are limited in the technology， Qualcomm jumped out as the savior. However， as the experts pointed out， China Mobile spent multi-billion yuan building the TDD network. If Qualcomm’s chips remain high in the price， they are not suitable to be installed in the low- and medium-end devices， which could render the 4G network useless and cause a multi-million loss on a daily basis.
The third level comes from the importance of the Chinese market for Qualcomm. The financial report of this company shows that Qualcomm’s financial revenue reached US$24.87 billion in 2013， US$12.3 billion， close to one half， of which came from the Chinese market. Qualcomm is undoubtedly not going to quit such a big market easily.
In the 3G era， Qualcomm reached an agreement with the Chinese government， ridding the mobile phone makers using TDSCDMA of the patent fees to Qualcomm. This was considered to be a win-win result– the TD-SCDMA network could develop fast as expected by the government and Qualcomm could seize the Chinese market quickly. Now the 4G network is ready to be spread out. For Qualcomm， a company that is always to grab the biggest profits， is not going to bend their knees so easily without a fight.
“When the NDRC is involved， the case is probably to be ended with Qualcomm’s lowering the price a bit give the Chinese domestic mobile phone manufacturers bigger spaces for profits in exchange for the smaller punishment the NDRC applies to Qualcomm，” an expert has been observing the case said.
The said battle was initiated by China’s National Development and Reform Commission （NDRC）， a political body of a sovereign country. Its opponent is Qualcomm， the absolute leader in the global mobile chip industry. On February 19， Xu Kunlin， director of Price Supervision and Anti-Monopoly at the NDRC， said in a press conference that the NDRC had already initiated an investigation into Qualcomm’s sole price fixing in the mobile chief field.
According to Xu Kunlin， those suing against Qualcomm’s monopolization are the relevant enterprises and industrial associations. They reported that Qualcomm， a company from the U.S.， abused its dominant place in the standards-essential patents of wireless communication and the mobile chip market to carry out the sole price fixing， including the unfairly high price， discriminatory price and unreasonable add-ons of terms of exchange.
This was the first time that the NDRC spoke about the case after the start of the investigation three months before that.
Before and After the “Assault”
On November 19， 2013， Shen Jin， Global Vice President of Qualcomm’s business development， was asked in his Microblog about Qualcomm’s contracts with terminal suppliers in the 4G market.
“In the test purchasing of China Mobile’s LTE project， the devices with Qualcomm’s chipsets always ranked among the top in the number. I believe that the most of 4G terminals that earliest come into the market will use Qualcomm’s chipsets，” he answered.
The answer showed Qualcomm’s confidence， as well as its power and market share. However， it also unintentionally placed Qualcomm under the anti-monopoly investigation. After this Microblog-based interview， the NDRC’s anti-monopoly investigators paid a surprise visit to Qualcomm’s offices in Beijing and Shanghai.
A source witnessing the investigations said that the investigators took away the digital copies of Qualcomm’s documents in price and market. They also threw a series of questions at Qualcomm about the price of its chips and the anti-monopoly investigation Qualcomm encountered in other countries.
Qualcomm is required to explain to the NDRC about how the prices of chips and relevant technologies are fixed in China and what kinds of cost were included. Meanwhile， they need to detail how and why the prices were changed in the past years. The second questions showed NDRC’s purpose of knowing what questions Qualcomm met in the anti-monopoly investigations in Japan， Korea and Korea. In that process， Qualcomm， as well as the observers， did not get the main investigation direction of the NDRC. It could only figure out that the investigation might be around the “abuse of dominant place in the market” stipulated in the third act of Anti-Monopoly Law based on the questions NDRC raised.
Both parties kept silent for a long while after the unexpected “investigation”. However， outsiders could still look into the case based on the product features， sales pattern of Qualcomm and the analysis of the market situation.
At present， Qualcomm is undoubtedly standing at the top of the mobile chip design in the world. In the 3G era， the massive 3G standards led by Qualcomm helped this company get a lot of fundamental patents in the CDMA field. Therefore， most of the chip manufacturers and device makers had to pay “patent commissions” for Qualcomm as long as they produce the 3G devices. On the other hand， Qualcomm is unmatched in the development and integration as it could provide the chip solutions for all 3G and 4G systems.
Qualcomm has been the champion in the mobile chip market for six straight years since 2007. The list of its clients covers Apple， Samsung， HTC， as well as Chinese domestic mobile phone makers like K-Touch， ZTE， Lenovo and Huawei. No other companies could compete with Qualcomm in that field. In the 3G mobile phone market of China， Qualcomm takes about 40% shares.
This leading position is to be further enhanced by the approaching 4G age. This saying is supported by the sound proof that Qualcomm’s chips took 60% of the TDD devices purchased by China Mobile in the second quarter of 2013.
“4G is not an independent being. It needs to be integrated with 2G， 3G and other wireless communication technologies. Therefore， in the 4G era， Qualcomm’s competitiveness is further improved，” said an observer.
According to the data from the domestic mobile phone manufacturers in China， Qualcomm collects the patent commission that accounts for 5% of the prices of the mobile phones compatible with five communication patterns and ten frequencies. These devices are now the most common devices in the 4G field. In addition， Qualcomm also collects the fees of chip design and others， allowing the company to take 20% of the sales price away from every 4G mobile phone sold in the future. In comparison， most of the Chinese mobile phone makers’ net profits only account for 5% of their total sales， further rendering the cost of chips unbearable.” Different from the intellectual property disputes between Huawei and IDC， which were ended one month earlier than the investigation into Qualcomm after being moved from the U.S. to China， Qualcomm’s opponent is lurking in the dark， waiting for the opportunities to throw the dart.
“The suitors are probably the mobile phone makers. That’s because， a）， it is very unlikely for the mobile phone makers to defeat Qualcomm through lawsuits in the court； and b）， the public litigation might ruin these companies’ relations with Qualcomm，” an insider speculated.
The price fixing of enterprises is actually very complicated. Therefore， it is hard to find the proofs to directly sue against the price fixing of Qualcomm. On the other hand， Qualcomm’s unshakeable leading position in the chips of smartphones cut the possibility of Chinese device makers， especially the smaller ones， to find an alternate supplier. Under that condition， it is a reasonable choice for these companies to turn to the NDRC， hoping to use the administrative force to keep Qualcomm at bay.
The Legal Stance
Even though the anti-monopoly investigation into Qualcomm has a complicated background， the legal rules and relations involved in this case are quite simple.
All the NDRC needs is to “confirm Qualcomm’s dominant position in the mobile chip market” and find the proof of “Qualcomm’s abusing of this dominance”， with which clear supporting clauses could be found in the third chapter of AntiMonopoly Law of China.
The previous words are enough to confirm the “dominant place of Qualcomm”. Now the problem remains with the“abuse of the dominance”.
The case of Huawei’s suing against IDC settled before the investigation provided necessary references and experiences. In October 2013， the Supreme Court of Guangdong adjudged the monopolization of IDC and asked the U.S. company to compensate Huawei with 20 million yuan.
Like the Qualcomm case， the suit between Huawei and IDC was also related to the communication products， standards-essential patents and the patent owners’ abuse of the dominance. The legal standards the Guangdong Supreme Court used in the Huawei-IDC case could be used as an important reference for the NDRC to deal with Qualcomm.
The legal experts once published a review about the Huawei-IDC case， in which they stated that the definition of the “relevant market”， according to the Anti-Monopoly Law， mainly depends whether – and how easily – can the products and services be replaced in the market. When the patents are combined with the technological standards， the operators are necessarily to apply some requirements for technologies and patents for the sake of the standards. The formation of the standards means that the product manufacturers are forced to use some certain patents， cutting the passage to the patent evasion. In the Huawei-IDC case， a conclusion could be made： the each of the standardsessential patents owners’essential patent-licensed market in the 3G wireless communication standards – WCDMA， CDMA2000， TD-SCDMA – in China and the U.S. is considered to be an independent relevant market， and the general relevant market is the agglomeration of these independent markets.
Therefore， the judges in Guangdong thought that the patent owners usually took the powerful positions during the negotiations with the patent licensees about licensing the patents. The fair market competition are impaired when the patent owners make use of their powerful positions to force the licensees to accept the conditions that might greatly impact their own interest and the patent licensees can turn to the legal method for self salvation.
In the Huawei-IDC case， the judge believe that the patent owner – IDC – has the absolute market share in every essential patent-licensed market concerning the 3G standard and they have the ability to hinder or affect the other operators’ access to the market. These granted IDC the power to control the price fixing of the 3Grelated essential patents and others， a must precondition for the “dominance in the market”.
As for the “abuse” part， the judges thought that it could happen when the two parties – the patent owners and patent licensees – are mismatched in the information concerning the patents during the negotiation. The laws require the patent owners to be fair， reasonable and without discrimination during the patent licensing negotiation and licensing agreements.
The ultimate foundation to see to the fairness， reasonability and non-discrimination is the price of patent pricing. In the Huawei-IDC case， the price IDC asks Apple and Samsung for using its patents is much lower than the one it asks Huawei to pay， meaning that unreasonable and discriminatory pricing could be found during the negotiation. In addition， IDC forced Huawei to grant it with the license to use Huawei’s own patents for free to gather extra profits， which was another proof for its malpractice in that case.
The anti-monopoly investigation into Qualcomm might be complicated than the Huawei-IDC case since Qualcomm not only licenses its patents， but also sells chips. This brings the shipping volume of Qualcomm into consideration when it comes to its abuse of the dominance in the market.
The Three Levels of Confrontation
In the investigation into Qualcomm， the NDRC could easily find supporting proofs to punish the U.S. company for its monopolization under the current legal frame. However， the Anti-Monopoly Law is considered to be a Damocles sword， which is the scariest when it suspends over someone’s head. The conflicts between NDRC and Qualcomm are fermenting and developing behind the uneventful surface. The NDRC just revealed a few facts that were said to be the proofs for Qualcomm’s monopolization and stated that the investigation was still going on with the punishment far from being available at this moment.
Actually， after the sudden assault last November， NDRC and Qualcomm only had a face-to-face confrontation once – on December 20， Qualcomm’s senior executives answered to the NDRC’s call of inquiry. According to a source， different from IDC which had promised to make changes， Qualcomm was quite determined. “That meeting featured communication with Qualcomm’s promise to cooperate during the negotiation. However， it did not mention anything about changes.”
Then the two parties never met each other till now. The announcement of NDRC that includes the sample of IDC might be a “hint” or even “warning” it delivered to Qualcomm.
In experts’ opinions， the tentative and steady progress in the investigation is actually a process in which both sides keep“losing blood”. If the potential interest or loss is counted in， the punishment of multi-million U.S. dollars – the highest amount according to the Anti-Monopoly Law – is nothing compared with entire 4G market of China in the future.
The first level of this confrontation rests with the terminal makers， especially those domestic mobile phone manufacturers clinging to the low- and medium-end market.
If Qualcomm wants to evade the punishment， the best way is to show its “sincerity” like IDC and lower the price of its chips and patent licensing. This could greatly lower the cost for domestic mobile phone makers， allowing them to stay closely behind Apple and Samsung at the beginning of the 4G era. However， most of the mobile phone companies in China are in short of innovation ability and core patents， rendering them powerful in the deal with Qualcomm， a supplier that they cannot get rid of easily.
The second level is related with the market shares of the three major telecom operators in China， as well as the strategic development of China’s communication industry.
Those following the leading standards will be the winner in the competition. This has been a solid rule in China’s communication industry in the past 2G and 3G era. In the 2G era， China Mobile and China Unicom followed the GSM network which was fixed by the European Telecom Standard Association while China Telecom adopted the CDMA network developed by the U.S. counterpart. In the 3G era， China developed TD-SCDMA standard， which was licensed to China Mobile for the convenience of promoting the standard with more self-owned patents. China Unicom followed the WCDMA developed by Europe while China Telecom turned to CDMA 2000 from the U.S. However， the TD-SCDMA is far behind WCDMA and CDMA200 in terms of the technological maturation. As a result， China Mobile， the once overlord of the telecom market in China， lost a lot of market to its competitors.
“After realizing its unconquerable defect in the 3G field， China Mobile began the distribution in the 4G network and base stations very early，” an insider of China Mobile said.
In the 4G era， the standards fall into two camps： the FDD and TDD. The two have no apparent gap in the technology. FDD is quite common in European and American countries while TDD owns more Chinese enterprises’ patents. On December 4， China’s Ministry of Industry and Information Technologies issued the 4G licenses. The three telecom operators were allowed to apply the TDD network at that time.
The Chinese government did this for “keeping the statesponsored technological standard ahead for a while”， even though the official reply was that it was not the right time to issue the FDD license.
The uncertainty in the market shifted the expectation for products suiting the FDD standards to the demand for the TDD-compatible devices. Since Chinese chip makers – and some other foreign companies – are limited in the technology， Qualcomm jumped out as the savior. However， as the experts pointed out， China Mobile spent multi-billion yuan building the TDD network. If Qualcomm’s chips remain high in the price， they are not suitable to be installed in the low- and medium-end devices， which could render the 4G network useless and cause a multi-million loss on a daily basis.
The third level comes from the importance of the Chinese market for Qualcomm. The financial report of this company shows that Qualcomm’s financial revenue reached US$24.87 billion in 2013， US$12.3 billion， close to one half， of which came from the Chinese market. Qualcomm is undoubtedly not going to quit such a big market easily.
In the 3G era， Qualcomm reached an agreement with the Chinese government， ridding the mobile phone makers using TDSCDMA of the patent fees to Qualcomm. This was considered to be a win-win result– the TD-SCDMA network could develop fast as expected by the government and Qualcomm could seize the Chinese market quickly. Now the 4G network is ready to be spread out. For Qualcomm， a company that is always to grab the biggest profits， is not going to bend their knees so easily without a fight.
“When the NDRC is involved， the case is probably to be ended with Qualcomm’s lowering the price a bit give the Chinese domestic mobile phone manufacturers bigger spaces for profits in exchange for the smaller punishment the NDRC applies to Qualcomm，” an expert has been observing the case said.