许多情况下,监管责任被委托给了独立机构,由此产生的问题是这些独立机构的民主问责制如何保证。目前没有多少经验方法能保障独立机构的问责。我们提供的方法具体有以下三方面:第一,我们仔细分析了独立机构在法理上(问责通过问责“法庭”的正式权利得以保障,以获得信息和承担后果)和在实际上(法庭根据资源和影响其制裁资格可信性的判决成本运用这些权利的能力)两方面的问责。第二,问责必须在政治、操作和管理三个层次上分别进行评估。第三,在上述每个层次上,由一个若干相互依赖的法庭所组成的系统来实施问责,从而共同形成一个问责体制。本文将此分析框架运用于适宜进行经验分析的德国联邦网络局问责体制案例。对实践工作者的启示监管型独立机构通常被认为是独立的,同时也是负责任的。本论文提供了一个问责“体制”研究的现实框架,监管型独立机构深受该“体制”的影响。该框架强调,必须区分各种主体(问责法庭),各个独立机构在形式上要向它们负责(议会委员会、审计机构、法院等),同时还要考虑这些主体之间的各种可能的关系。我们认为官方文件定义里的正式的“书面”问责,没有完全阐明实际问责。实际问责取决于法庭拥有的资源(主要是信息处理和决策能力)及其制裁能力的可信性。本论文将此框架应用于德国联邦网络局。 In many cases, regulatory responsibilities are delegated to independent agencies, and the resulting question is how to guarantee democratic accountability in these independent agencies. There is not much empirical way to guarantee the accountability of independent agencies. We provide the following three specific methods: First, we carefully analyze the legal (independent accountability through accountability “court ” to protect the formal rights to obtain information and bear the consequences) and in fact (Courts are accountable for their ability to apply these rights on the basis of their resources and the costs of judgments that affect the credibility of their sanction qualifications). Second, accountability must be assessed separately at the three levels of politics, operations and management. Thirdly, at each of the above levels, accountability is implemented by a system of several interdependent tribunals, which together form an accountability system. This article applies this analytical framework to the case of the German Federal Bureau of Cyber ​​Accountability system that is empirically analyzed empirically. Implications for Practitioners Regulatory independent institutions are often considered independent and also responsible. This essay provides a realistic framework for accountability “institutional ” research, and supervisory independent institutions are deeply influenced by the “system ”. The framework emphasizes the need to differentiate between various actors (accountability tribunals) and formally accountable to all independent bodies (parliamentary committees, auditors, courts, etc.), while also considering the various possible relationships between these subjects . We think the formal “written” accountability in the definition of official documents does not fully clarify the actual accountability. The actual accountability depends on the credibility of the Tribunal’s resources (mainly information processing and decision-making capabilities) and its sanctioning capacity. This paper applies this framework to the German Federal Internet Office.