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网络伪舆情的监管治理区别于普通网络舆情的监管引导,目前专门针对伪舆情深入分析的策略研究相对较少。分析了伪舆情的危害,利用演化博弈方法建立伪舆情相关干系方的三方演化博弈模型,分析了治理网络伪舆情中各要素间的博弈关系。各方策略的选择受多种因素的共同影响,系统不会固定收敛于某一个均衡策略集合,监管成本、处罚力度等因素会直接影响系统的演化方向。最后给出针对网络伪舆情治理的具体策略建议。
The supervision and management of network pseudo-public opinion is different from the supervision and guidance of public network of public opinion. At present, there are relatively few research on the strategy of in-depth analysis of pseudo public opinion. Analyzes the harm of pseudo public opinion, establishes the tripartite evolutionary game model of pseudo public opinion related stakeholders through evolutionary game theory, and analyzes the game relationship between the various elements in the governance network pseudo public opinion. The choice of strategy of each party is influenced by many factors. The system will not converge to a certain equilibrium strategy set. The factors such as regulatory costs and penalties will directly affect the evolution direction of the system. At last, it gives the specific tactics advice on the governance of pseudo-public opinion on internet.