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在西方的政治游戏中,税收与选票之间的曲线轨迹具有可测性。因受民选官员任期制的影响,被选票绑架的税收政策具有鲜明的周期性特征。政客们为了赢得选票,也会竭尽全力向民众承诺更多的福利和更少的税收。选民们也明白,只有进入“政治季节”才能争取到更多的利益,选票“税含量”也越来越多地成为选民们在饭桌上讨论的重要话题。在笔者看来,当一项税收政策企图通过借助政治谶纬发挥绞杀对手的作用时,财政上不出点麻烦反倒不正常了。
In western political games, the trace of the curve between taxation and balloting is testable. Due to the influence of the term of office of elected officials, the taxation policy of being abducted by votes has a distinctive periodicity. In order to win votes, politicians will do everything in their power to commit more benefits and fewer taxes to the people. Voters also understand that only getting into the “political season” can win more benefits. Ballot papers “tax content” are also increasingly becoming important topics for voters to discuss at the dinner table. In the author’s opinion, when a tax policy attempts to strangle an opponent by means of political 谶 latitude, it does not appear to be troublesome financially but abnormally.