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从理论上讲,保险人和投保人总是处于欺诈和反欺诈的博弈之中,欺诈有收益也有成本,反欺诈需要成本支出也能获得收益。按照经济人的假定,保险人和被保险人在不完全信息的动态博弈中会达到一个均衡,在这个均衡点上双方的策略处于最优,这时的保险合同也是最优保险合同：部分保险。基于保险人和投保人双方最优博弈策略的保险合同形式不可能是足
In theory, insurers and policyholders are always in the game between fraud and anti-fraud. There are also benefits and costs of fraud. Anti-fraud requires cost and benefits. According to the hypothesis of the economist, the insurer and the insured will reach an equilibrium in the dynamic game of incomplete information. At this equilibrium point, the strategies of both parties are the best, and the insurance contract at this time is also the optimal insurance contract: part of the insurance . Insurance contract based on the optimal game strategy between the insurer and the insured can not be sufficient