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本文提出并验证了下列四个基本假说,第一,过低的股东法律保护程度决定了我国上市公司过高的股权集中度;第二,虽然我国法律保护程度不断有所提高,但我国上市公司股权集中度非但没有降低甚至还有所提高;第三,国有股对上市公司业绩有负面影响,而法人股正好相反;第四,股权集中度高的上市公司的绩效其实好于或不显著差于集中度较低公司的绩效,而且就对公司绩效的解释能力来说,股权结构一般高于董事会结构、经理薪酬、融资结构等其他治理机制的解释能力。
This paper proposes and validates the following four basic hypotheses. First, the degree of legal protection of shareholders with too low a level determines the excessively high degree of ownership concentration of listed companies in China. Second, although the degree of legal protection in China continues to increase, the listed companies in China The concentration of ownership has not been reduced or even increased. Third, state-owned shares have a negative impact on the performance of listed companies, while corporate stocks have the opposite effect. Fourth, the performance of listed companies with high equity concentration is actually better than or not significantly worse than concentration. The performance of the company is relatively low, and in terms of the ability to interpret the company’s performance, the ownership structure is generally higher than the explanatory power of other governance mechanisms such as the board structure, manager’s compensation, and financing structure.