论文部分内容阅读
本文基于中国转型经济制度背景,以2005年-2007年间中国上市公司为对象,考察了地方政府治理水平对企业投资行为的作用机理。研究发现较高的地方政府治理水平能够激励和监督管理者做出基于公司专有信息的投资决策,而不是盲目地模仿行业内其他公司的投资行为,降低行业和公司层面的投资同步性。如果地方政府治理水平较高,公司利益被政府或其他官僚机构侵占概率会降低,这会提高公司从信息采集中获取的期望收益,降低公司投资同步性;进一步研究发现,地方政府治理水平对公司投资同步性的影响在终极产权不同性质的公司中存在着显著性差异,相对国有企业,地方政府对投资行为的治理效应在民营企业中更显著,政府治理对国有企业投资行为的影响随着实际控制人的行政级别提高而降低。
Based on the background of China’s transitional economy system, this paper examines the mechanism of local government governance on the investment behavior of Chinese listed companies from 2005 to 2007. The study found that higher levels of local government governance can motivate and supervise managers to make investment decisions based on company-specific information rather than blindly imitating the investment behavior of other companies in the industry and reducing investment synchronization at the industry and company level. If the level of governance of local governments is high, the probability of corporate interests being encroached upon by government or other bureaucracies will be lower, which will increase the company’s expected return from information acquisition and reduce the synchronization of corporate investment. Further research finds that the level of governance of local governments The impact of investment synchronization exists in companies with different properties of ultimate property. There are significant differences in the governance of investment behavior between state-owned enterprises and local governments in private enterprises. The influence of government governance on the investment behavior of state-owned enterprises varies with the actual The administrative level of the controller increases and decreases.