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知识发送方的风险态度会影响知识流失风险普遍存在的企业间知识转移。为了防控企业间知识转移中的知识流失,考虑知识发送方的风险态度为私有信息,当知识发送方公布虚假风险态度类型,或者知识接收方不相信其公布信息的行为被发现时均会遭受诚信惩罚。利用演化博弈论分析了知识发送方风险态度披露策略和知识接收方信息处理策略的演化均衡,以及其对知识转移的影响,找出了既能最大化双方总收益又能避免知识流失的最佳演化均衡,探讨了实现该均衡的方法,并用算例对结论加以说明。研究表明:知识发送方应结合自身风险态度设置诚信惩罚;诚信惩罚足够大时,一定能实现最佳演化均衡;否则,仅风险厌恶方可能通过增大诚信惩罚,或者选择对其诚信惩罚较大的知识接收方,实现最佳演化均衡。上述结论为企业应如何防控知识转移中的知识流失提供了参考,丰富了企业间知识转移的相关研究成果。
The risk attitude of the knowledge sender affects the knowledge transfer between enterprises that is at risk of knowledge loss. In order to prevent the loss of knowledge in knowledge transfer between enterprises, consider the risk attitude of knowledge sender as private information, when the knowledge sender announces the type of false risk attitude, or if the knowledge recipient does not believe the information disclosure is found Honesty and punishment. Using evolutionary game theory, this paper analyzes the evolution equilibrium of knowledge sender’s risk attitude disclosure strategy and information receiver’s information processing strategy and its impact on knowledge transfer, and finds out the best way to maximize both the total revenue and the knowledge loss Evolutionary equilibrium, explores the method of achieving this equilibrium, and illustrates the conclusions with examples. The research shows that the sender of knowledge should set the integrity penalty according to his own risk attitude. When the integrity punishment is large enough, the best evolution equilibrium will be achieved. Otherwise, only the risk aversion can be punished by increasing the integrity, or choose to punish the honesty Knowledge receiver, to achieve the best evolutionary equilibrium. The above conclusions provide reference for enterprises on how to prevent and control knowledge loss in knowledge transfer and enrich the related research results of knowledge transfer among enterprises.