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道德怀疑主义的回溯论证依赖于一个重要前提,即由“是”推出“应当”是逻辑上无效的,而道德自然主义者否认这个前提。马克·内尔森提出了两个反例来试图证明:“是”与“应当”之间不存在逻辑上的鸿沟;我们能够基于由“是”到“应当”的推理来确证我们的道德信念。但是,对他的论证的考察表明,即使他的反例成功地证明“是”与“应当”问题的确不是一个逻辑问题,要么由于我们不能确证地相信那些作为前提的事实命题,要么由于我们的确证仍然依赖于某些隐藏的道德预设,因此,我们也不能够用类似的推理来确证我们的道德信念。总之,道德自然主义~①对道德怀疑主义的批驳并不成功。
The retrospective argument of moral skepticism relies on an important premise that it is logically ineffective to be introduced by “yes ” and that moral naturalists deny this premise. Mark Nelson proposed two counterexamples to try to prove that there is no logical gap between “yes ” and “should ”; and we can base on the “from” to “should” Reasoning to confirm our moral beliefs. However, the examination of his argument shows that even if his counterexample succeeds in proving that the question “” and “should ” is indeed not a logical one, or because we can not conclusively believe those factual propositions as the premises, either Since our corroboration still relies on some hidden moral presuppositions, we can not corroborate our moral beliefs with similar reasoning. In short, moral naturalism-the refutation of moral skepticism-did not succeed.